Comments by Molnár, Miklós
Comments
Despite differences in both the subject matter and the points
of view expressed in the four papers about which I have been
asked to comment, I am left with the impression that they
have certain common tendencies. Each of the authors at-
tempts in his own way to add a piece to a puzzle which,
despite innumerable studies about the disintegration of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, still remains unsolved.
Two of the papers approach the subject in a general way.
Fritz Fellner has attempted to analyze all of the many factors
that precipitated the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, while
Stefan Pascu, in his study entitled "The National Unity of
the Romanians and the Breakup of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire," has looked at the problem entirely from the point
of view of the national unity of the Romanians. The other two
papers are scholarly studies of two specific questions. Robert
F. Hopwood has analyzed "The Conflict between Count
Czernin and Emperor Charles in 1918," and Alfred D. Low
has given an account of Austria's relations with Budapest and
Berlin in his paper on "Austria between East and West:
Budapest and Berlin, 1918-1919."
While each of the papers is concerned with a piece of the
puzzle, the picture will never be complete, for we shall never
have a satisfactory, overall explanation for the disintegration
of the monarchy. None of the papers pretends to give an
answer to what is still an unanswerable question. Yet, despite
the undoubted intrinsic value of each paper, the discussion
continues—in the Austrian History Yearbook as well as else-
where. For example, in his most recent book,1 Victor L.
Tapie rejects the thesis that the history of the Danubian area
is characterized by an unceasing fight of the nationalities
against a centralizing monarchy. He shows that the nationality
problem is actually of relatively recent origin and insists
that it must not be identified with, or explained by, the an-
tagonisms of class, religion, or historic rights. Moreover, he
maintains that it is inaccurate to talk about a single govern-
mental system that remained unchanged throughout the cen-
1Monarchie et peuples du Danube (Paris: Fayard, 1969).
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92 MOLNAR
turies, for the Habsburgs frequently endeavored to adapt their
political and administrative systems to the conditions pre-
vailing at particular periods. Of course, their efforts were not
always successful, but their failures were caused by both
external and internal difficulties.
It may well be that we will never know why the monarchy
disintegrated. Let us not forget that we have still not found
a satisfactory explanation for the disappearance of the Roman
empire fifteen hundred years ago. One of the difficulties in
finding a definite and clear-cut explanation for the collapse
of the Habsburg monarchy is that a totally objective study is
impossible. A person's own underlying concepts are bound to
influence what he writes—a weakness which Fellner acknowl-
edges with even greater precision when he speaks about the
"superabundance of special studies [which] seriously endan-
ger efforts to approach the subject from the point of view of
universal historical continuity."2 Fellner also points to the
limitations of such studies when he refers to the irrelevance
of the writings of certain Austrian historians who maintain
that "the collapse is only a perpetuation of a claim advanced
before 1918 by the German-Austrians, acting in the capacity
of representatives of the central administrative offices in
Vienna, that the policies of the government in Vienna repre-
sented the whole empire."3 In a similar vein, he stresses the
limitations of historians belonging to the non-German na-
tionalities of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy by stat-
ing that much of what they say belongs to the past.
Yet, with remarkable optimism he asserts "that historians
are now endeavoring to attain objectivity and are ready to
recognize the national and political goals of other peoples
when they write about the collapse of the monarchy. That
understanding which could not be reached in the midst of
political quarrel has been realized by historical scholarship."4
Such optimism is indeed remarkable, but any historian who
reads Pascu's article on "The National Unity of the Ro-
manians and the Breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire"
realizes that this eminent Romanian historian does not seem
"ready to recognize the national and political goals of other
peoples."5 Pascu's paper, while extremely interesting, barely
"See ante, p. 5.
"See ante, pp. 4-5.
4See ante, p. 4.
'Ibid.
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COMMENTS 93
reaches beyond the treadmill of a certain historiography,
fashionable during the interwar period, which violently
condemned the "repression of . . . nationalities"6 and "a
regime that was able to maintain itself only with the support
of the gendarmerie and the military system."7 For Pascu, it
seems self-evident that "the lack of economic unity of the Dual
Monarchy was another important reason for the collapse."8
His main thesis is far removed from the subtly-shaded posi-
tion assumed by Karel Pichlik at the November, 1968, Reims
conference on "Europe in November, 1918:" "While before
the war Austria-Hungary was a power" that was courted
by the Entente Powers, "after the war the Western Powers
wanted to have new allies in this part of the world and in
Europe." Among the inhabitants of the former Austro-Hun-
garian empire this "role could be played only by the political
representatives of the national liberation movements."
However, the subjectivity which may account for the nar-
row-mindedness of certain historians was not necessarily de-
rived from nationalistic convictions or inspired by the nostal-
gia of the Viennese for the old empire. For instance, what
about the notion of the Soviet historians who contend that the
lucky conjunction in 1917 of triumphant nationalism and com-
munism made the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy
"inevitable?" How would Fellner categorize this kind of
approach?
It seems to me that Fellner wishes to approach the subject
"from the point of view of universal historical continuity,"
on the one hand, while, on the other, he advocates using "the
modern methodology of social scientists as auxiliary tools."0
Unfortunately, he does not define his method clearly enough
for us to be able to accept it as a remedy. He himself rarely
resorts to the "modern methodology of social science" in his
paper. Neither does he tell us what kind of continuity he has
in mind when he talks about the "universal history approach."
Is it the continuity of the collective security system based on
the balance of powers existing before 1914? Is it cultural con-
tinuity? Or economic continuity? Or the continuity of the
monarchy as a supranational entity? Nowhere does he state
"See ante, p. 63.
'See ante, p. 67.
"See ante, p. 63.
"See ante, p. 5.
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94 MOLNAR
exactly what he has in mind when he talks about continuity
or the integration of all elements of a "general" continuity.
Thus, Fellner's paper, while well written and well docu-
mented, is more a personal than a general interpretation. It
is "general" only so far as it is a mixture of considerations
which are neither integrated nor systematized. Moreover,
Fellner's views, while sometimes pertinent, are often subject
to question. His explanation of why and how the monarchy col-
lapsed actually closely resembles that of his predecessors. For
instance, he states: "As for the Austro-Germans, they are
still dominated by the idea that military defeat alone brought
on the collapse of the monarchy—that, had it not been for the
war and the military defeat, the monarchy would have con-
tinued to exist."10 And a little later he asserts that a "careful
study of the actual course of events during the time of dissolu-
tion would indicate clearly that the internal disintegration did
not have to be initiated from outside the monarchy."11 Yet the
reader subsequently becomes aware that Fellner feels obliged
to explain the disintegration of the Habsburg empire by the
evolution of inter-allied diplomacy, i. e., of a force that came
"from outside the monarchy."
This time he is not wrong. It is obvious that both "inside"
and "outside" factors played a role in undermining the Habs-
burg empire. However, the most recent research tends to show
that the fate of the monarchy rested above all in the hands
of the victorious Allies who subsequently imposed their deci-
sions upon the peoples of Central Europe. In this connection
mention should be made of Leo Valiani's La dissoluzione dell'
Austria-Ungheria,12 which is one of the finest studies on the
subject. Both Valiani and other scholars have recently called
attention to a few quite obvious facts. First of all, they ask
how it is possible to assert that if the Central Powers had
won the war an empire would have disappeared from the
political map of Europe? After all, the war was still far from
won in 1915 and 1916. Likewise, who knows what would have
happened if the Allied Powers had succeeded in making a
separate peace with Austria-Hungary? Fellner himself real-
izes "how disastrous the German orientation of Austro-Hun-
garian foreign policy was for the existence of the Austro-
10See ante, p. 7.
"Ibid.
"Published in Milan by II Saggiatore in 1966.
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Hungarian monarchy."13 He is also aware that external fac-
tors played an important part in the breakup of the monarchy.
"The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy," he
writes, "must be looked at in connection with both the col-
lapse of Russia's position as a Great Power and the disinte-
gration of the Ottoman empire."14
In short, I believe that, no matter how much the national
movements may have contributed to the collapse of Austria-
Hungary, these movements would have been unsuccessful had
it not been for the war and Austria-Hungary's defeat. Fellner
gives no proof to the contrary—and no one ever will. But the
mere fact that Fellner admits that the nationality problem
was extremely important shows that he has introduced a
value judgment into his discussion. So have historians of the
Viennese school when they support their analyses with argu-
ments about the value of stability and equilibrium; the Social
Democrats, when they wrote about the all-importance of
supranationality; and the Bolshevists, when they wax elo-
quent over the happy marriage between communism and na-
tionalism a la Lenin. Others do the same when they stress
the importance of federalism or economic efficiency, in com-
parison with the lesser economic opportunities of small na-
tions.
Fellner's analysis is valuable because he contributes new
ideas as well as facts. But I do not believe that the time has
come to write broad syntheses, for it is still necessary to clear
up many problems through detailed, special monographic
studies. Moreover, we still need more time just to think things
over. Numerous and contradictory aspects of the whole prob-
lem still need to be studied in depth before we are ready for
sound comprehensive syntheses.
It is obvious that, whether he writes a general synthesis
or deals with a special problem, each historian's approach to
the many factors involved in the disintegration of the Habs-
burg monarchy will be strongly influenced by his own under-
lying concept of what constitutes the real essence of the prob-
lem. For instance, a historian who examines the breakup of
the empire from the perspective of the European balance of
power will inevitably come to conclusions that differ consider-
ably from those of another historian who focuses his attention
"See ante, p. 10.
"See ante, p. 22.
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96 MOLNAB
on the national movements. The whole problem will be viewed
in still another light by those who approach it from a socio-
logical, cultural, or economic point of view. A satisfactory
synthesis can never be written as long as such opposing,
often contradictory, points of view are glossed over or kept
hidden. On the contrary, a true synthesis can eventually be
made only if the whole problem is first studied from as many
angles as possible and if opposing viewpoints are identified
and taken into consideration insofar as they merit it.
Graduate Institute of MIKL6S MOLNAR
International Studies, Geneva
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